Introduction
Economists' explanations for price wars differ from those of other observers of the airline industry. Most economic models of price wars, which apply more generally than to the airline industry alone, have emphasized the role of fluctuations in demand. Changes in demand alter the expected profitability of undercutting a tacitly collusive equilibrium; depending on the assumptions made, the models predict that price wars occur either when demand booms or when it slumps.
Industry insiders, meanwhile, identify the financial troubles of an individual carrier as an important motivation in initiating the fare cuts that trigger price wars. For example:
[Mark Daugherty, airline industry analyst for Dean Witter] said weaker airlines are willing to risk losses with low ticket prices in order to raise badly needed cash. "That is what is driving a lot of these companies," said Daugherty. (Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1991, p. 4.) This comment and others like it suggest that firms' financial situations might play an important but neglected role in determining price wars. In light of these observations, this article asks whether price wars in the airline industry stem in part from the financial conditions of individual firms, and, in particular, whether financially troubled firms are more likely to start price wars.
Several results from the corporate finance literature lend theoretical support to the industry observations. In particular, some models indicate that firms in poor financial condition discount future returns more heavily than do financially sound firms. This suggests that, as a result,
Background
Price wars. A price war is a period in which the firms in an industry or market set prices that are significantly below the usually prevailing prices, generally implying a change in strategy within a set of oligopolists. In game-theoretic terms, this can be modelled as a temporary period of noncooperative behavior among players whose normal course is a (tacitly) collusive equilibrium.
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Models of price wars fall broadly into three classes, distinguished by when and why price wars occur.
In the first class, price wars occur in periods of low demand because of firms' cost structures. For example, Staiger and Wolak (1992) contend that a firm facing capacity constraints will have an incentive to cut its price only when it has idle capacity, which is more likely when demand is low, while Scherer (1980) argues that a firm will have an incentive to cut prices when demand is low if it has high fixed costs to cover. In the second class of models, price wars occur because a firm cannot observe its competitors' prices, and therefore it interprets a fall in demand for its own output as a sign that one of its competitors has offered customers a secret price cut. A stochastic period of low overall demand will thus prompt a retaliatory price cut, instigating a price war (Green and Porter, 1984) . In the third class of models, price wars occur when demand is high and the immediate rewards from undercutting competitors are therefore largest (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991) . In this last class of models, a price war is not a shift from collusive to noncooperative behavior. Accordingly, Ellison (1994) suggests that "countercyclical pricing" more accurately describes what is captured by these models than "price wars." Ellison argues further, however, that if these models were extended to an environment of uncertain demand, they would indeed predict price wars to occur when demand booms. 2, 3 In all these models, demand fluctuations, which are common in the airline industry for both seasonal and cyclical reasons, provoke price wars. But not all the models describe the airline industry well. The secret price deals of Green and Porter, for example, are unlikely to occur in this industry because of computerized reservation systems and a large and dispersed customer base. The first class of models most closely matches the characteristics of the airline industry, including capacity constraints and high fixed costs.
Financial condition. The observations, cited in the Introduction, that a carrier's financial troubles may prompt it to initiate a fare war have support in theoretical results showing that a firm's financial condition affects its valuation of future payoffs and thus its actions. This result has been framed in several different contexts. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that because equityholders are residual claimants who realize gains only in good states, they prefer activities that raise payoffs in good states, even at the cost of lowering payoffs in bad states. 4 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) identify a similar principle in the context of credit rationing. In a related vein, Brander and Lewis (1986) consider firms engaged in Cournot competition that must commit to output levels before observing demand. A highly leveraged firm will compete aggressively by producing the high level of output that is optimal in high-demand states, since only then does it realize a nonzero residual claim. Chevalier (1995) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995, 1996) provide empirical evidence that a firm's financial condition can affect the strategy it pursues.
A firm that initiates a price war makes a tradeoff similar to those described above, raising current profits in exchange for lower profits in the future, and possibly lower overall profits. There are two reasons for a financially distressed firm to make this tradeoff: "bagging the bondholder" and "gambling." If the firm is likely to go bankrupt in the future, the current owners and managers have reason to disregard what happens to the firm after they have lost control. They will prefer to shift returns from the future into the present, even if doing so lowers the firm's overall returns, leaving the bondholder "holding the bag."
Alternatively, if the current owners or managers can forestall bankruptcy by boosting shortterm profits at the expense of the long term, they have an incentive to do so if there is any chance that the firm's situation will improve in the future. They are no worse off by taking this "gamble," since bankruptcy costs are borne by the debtholders.
The remaining question is why a fare cut that might instigate a price war would help a financially troubled airline to shift returns from the future to the present. One way a carrier could benefit from a price war at the expense of its competitors would be if cutting price allowed it to increase market share because competitors reacted with a lag or not at all. 5 In practice, airlines appear to respond to fare changes very quickly, usually within a day, although there may remain a first-mover advantage if consumers are more likely to be aware of low prices at the airline that initiated the fare cut, placed ads first, attracted travel agents' attention, and so on.
It seems more likely that airlines benefit because price wars allow them to "borrow" demand from future periods. This will be the case under the plausible assumption that some consumers are willing to purchase tickets sooner than they had planned if they are offered sufficiently attractive prices. There is certainly industry discussion of this as one of the major effects of price wars. Bhattacharya (1997) formalizes this in a model of "survival price wars" in which a financially distressed airline will cut prices in order to boost current period demand, even if it knows that its competitor will match the price.
Price wars in the airline industry. The existing empirical literature on airline price wars that is most similar to the present work is Morrison and Winston (1996) , who consider a number of different explanations simultaneously, concluding that price wars are more likely if demand expectations-as measured by GDP-are incorrect, and less likely if one of the carriers serving a route is bankrupt. Although the aim is similar, my article's approach differs from Morrison and Winston's in considering financial motivations and in looking separately at price war initiators. Brander and Zhang (1993) study airline price wars using a conjectural variations approach to characterize particular duopolists' interaction as quantity setting with periodic switches between collusive and noncollusive behavior. However, they do not investigate the cause of the regime switches. Finally, Borenstein and Rose (1995) focus on the effect of bankruptcy on airlines' pricing strategies, although not on price wars directly. Examining major bankruptcies between 1989 and 1993, they find that bankrupt carriers' average prices are 5% lower than industry trends for several months before bankruptcy, although at the time of bankruptcy there is little change in prices. This they interpret to suggest that "financial distress rather than bankruptcy per se may be responsible for observed changes in an airline's price preferences" (p. 399).
Data
The price data that studies of the airline industry usually use come from Databank 1A of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Origin and Destination (O&D) Survey. This survey is a 10% ticket sample that reports route and fare information by quarter. Morrison and Winston (1996) and Brander and Zhang (1993) identify price wars from this data by defining classification rules based on either the raw price data or econometric results.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) collects these data when a ticket is used, not when it is purchased, which causes several problems in using the data to identify price wars. The first problem is that the fares available in most fare wars are applicable for travel dates long after the fare war itself ends. As a result, the evidence of a fare war will not necessarily show up in the price database as a sudden concentration of very-low-priced tickets. Instead, the tickets purchased in a fare war become observations in Databank 1A piecemeal as travellers use them. Second, observations at any point in time contain both tickets of passengers who purchased during a price war and tickets of passengers who did not. Third, the data are available quarterly, which is a long interval relative to the length of most price wars.
The effect of the data collection method is to both dilute the evidence of a fare ware and to smear it over time. This effect is evident in Morrison and Winston (1996) . They define price wars to begin when average fares fall by a certain percentage and to end when fares rise by any amount. By this definition, they find that price wars last 1.8 quarters on average, with a modal length of two quarters. As evidenced in the newspaper ads that usually accompany fare wars, price reductions rarely last that long. More typically, airlines offer low, price-war fares for only a few weeks.
In addition to complicating the identification of price wars, the collection of fare data by date of travel makes it impossible to determine who initiated the price war. Since competitors usually respond to a price cut within days, Databank 1A almost certainly will not show an initiator's fares dropping ahead its competitors' fares. While this is of little consequence in testing hypotheses about the timing of price wars relative to demand cycles, it is critical to identify the price-war initiator in testing hypotheses in which the incentives of individual firms to initiate a price war differ across firms and over time.
This article considers just such a hypothesis, namely, that financially distressed airlines are willing to risk a price war in order to cut prices when other carriers would not. Existing empirical work on price wars (Porter, 1983; Ellison, 1994; and Morrison and Winston, 1996) has not distinguished between firms that led or followed in price wars. This may have been motivated both by the theoretical emphasis on demand fluctuations in explaining price wars and by the unavailability of appropriate data.
Identification of price wars. To avoid the shortcomings of using Databank 1A, I identify price wars by using reports in the press. As a result of the scrutiny that the airline industry receives, not only the airlines but also travel agents, analysts, reporters, and even the ticket-buying public seem to agree on when a price war is occurring. This article takes advantage of that attention and consensus by using the Wall Street Journal to identify price wars.
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I used the Wall Street Journal Index, an annually published topical guide, to direct me to articles in the Wall Street Journal itself that contained information on price wars. For each topic, the Index lists a summary of each corresponding article in the Wall Street Journal. 7 The relevant Index topics for airline price wars were "Airlines" and "Airlines-Rates" until 1990 and "AirlinesUnited States" thereafter.
I read each summary under these topics looking for articles that described price wars. Key phrases indicating such articles included "fare cut," "fare war," "discount fares," "price war," "fare reduction," "slashed fares," "price promotion," "price cut," and so on. I then read each original article whose summary contained these or related phrases. I erred on the side of caution, looking up an article if there was any evidence in the Index summary that it described a price war. 8 The text of the articles describing price wars typically listed who had initiated the action and the response of competing carriers, as well as the extent of the routes affected and an indication of the size of the price cut.
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To understand the Wall Street Journal's coverage, I also spoke to two of the reporters who wrote many of the articles about price wars during the sample period. According to them, reporters during this period employed multiple sources of information to monitor price-war activity. For example, when an airline cut fares, it usually sent out a press release over newswire services and often placed advertisements in the Wall Street Journal and other major newspapers. Additionally, one of the reporters checked daily for unusual numbers of filings with the Airline Tariff Publishing Company, which does the back-end work of collecting and compiling fare data for airline reservations systems. The reporters also had supplemental information from personal contacts among airline pricing officials. Both reporters said it was standard procedure to contact all the major carriers about their intended responses, including additional checks and supplementary articles in the days following an initial price-cut announcement. One of the reporters, whose specific assignment during four years of the sample period was airline pricing, said the coverage during the 1985-1992 period was very aggressive; both reporters were confident that virtually all price wars were covered. Ultimately, the features of the industry that make secret price cuts infeasible-rapid, reliable, and easily available price information-also make it possible for the reporters to be confident that they have identified all major price wars.
I had to use some discretion in deciding, based on the textual description, what should be categorized as a price war for the purposes of this article. My aim was to identify substantial, temporary drops in price affecting a broad set of routes. For example, the Index entry for the first fare war covered in this article reads as follows:
American Airlines plans new fares on more than 2,400 routes that are about 70% below coach fares; the move was immediately matched by a number of competitors, sending airline stocks sharply lower.
I found no instances of price cuts that went unmatched by another carrier. This could be either because price cuts are never unmatched, or because such an event is not deemed newsworthy. Evidence against the latter is given, for example, in a pair of articles from June 1986 in which the first article mentions only Continental Airlines's unilateral action, followed by TWA in a subsequent article a few days later. If unilateral action is nevertheless not always covered, my dependent variable in the regressions that follow will be measured with error, biasing the results against statistical significance.
In understanding what I categorized as a price war, it may be helpful to understand what kinds of events I did not consider to meet that definition. Instances of price decreases that were not categorized as price wars included the following:
(i) Price cuts on limited routes (for example, routes only to Florida, or routes only out of Chicago or Newark).
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(ii) Cuts in fares that are not applicable to most travellers (for example, senior citizen or business class fares).
(iii) Price cuts on international routes (primarily routes to Europe).
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(iv) Price cuts for travel on very selected days (for example, travel restricted to Thanksgiving Day). (v) An easing of restrictions (for example, a seven-day instead of fourteen-day advance purchase requirement for a particular class of fares).
In addition, I would have excluded price cuts had there appeared to be industry consensus that they were necessary adaptations to changed conditions. Price increases of this sort are common when, for example, the industry is faced with rising fuel costs. However, the airline industry does not appear to coordinate on price decreases in the same way; there were no cases of price decreases in which carriers' actions reflected or seemed designed to seek consensus.
Based on the information contained in the articles, I created a series for each carrier that indicates for each month whether a firm initiated a price war, whether it joined an existing price war, or whether it had no participation in a price war.
12 I collected data for the 14 largest firms during the period 1985-1992. 13 During those eight years there were 31 price wars. On average, just over half the carriers participated in any given price war. All the carriers except Piedmont, Republic, and Western were responsible for starting a price war at some point during the sample period.
Other data. Data on airline traffic and on airline financial characteristics, which come from publications of the U.S. DOT, supplemented the data on the occurrence of price wars. Traffic data are reported monthly and are for domestic operations. Financial data, which are available only quarterly, are matched to the corresponding month.
Limitations of the data. Although this approach is better able to time price wars precisely and to distinguish leaders and followers, it also has limitations. One, already described in detail, is that the classification of price wars is ultimately based on the comparison of a verbal description of an event to a verbal definition of a price war. This makes the definition of a price war somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that changes in conduct may not match perfectly with changes in the pricewar measure. A second limitation is that the binary measure necessarily misses both the depth of the price cut and its availability in terms of the number of seats offered at that price. A final concern is that despite the efforts of the reporters, some price wars or the participation of some carriers may not be reported. I have tried to mitigate this concern by restricting my sample to major carriers and by using dummy variables in the regression to capture any differences between the reported activities of large and small carriers attributable to size alone. Although the data used in this study have valuable advantages, it is important to keep these limitations in mind.
Model
If price wars are started by airlines that reduce prices in response to financial pressures, then those that initiate the price reductions and those that later match them may have very different reasons for their choices. In light of this, this article splits the analysis of price wars into the decision to lead a price war and the decision to follow, or to match the price reductions of other carriers. The primary emphasis is on the decision to lead a price war, and on the role that a firm's financial condition plays in that decision.
The probability that a given firm will start a price war in a given quarter is modelled as a 11 Fare wars on international routes were excluded for lack of data on the competing, non-U.S. carriers that also served those routes, and also because fares set by U.S. carriers on those routes can be (and are) rejected by foreign governments. Furthermore, international fare wars do not spill over into the domestic market.
12 There are months in which two carriers are identified as price-war leaders. There are two reasons for this. Occasionally, two price-war events occur within a month. On other occasions, carriers are reported as acting simultaneously, especially Continental and Eastern, which were both units of TexasAir during part of the sample. 13 A chronology of price wars, including who were leaders and followers, is also available at www.rje.org.
function of three types of variables: demand, the financial characteristics of the firm, and controls:
Equation (1) is estimated using a probit model, although, as noted later, estimating it with a linear probability model produces very similar results.
Demand. The relevant demand for the firm's decision could be either demand for the firm's own output or overall industry demand. The theoretical literature often assumes that firms offer homogeneous products and face a common industry demand curve, making demand for each firm some fraction of the total industry demand (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991) . In practice, it is not likely that consumers perceive service on different airlines to be truly homogeneous. Airlines differ in scheduling and perceived quality, and because of loyalty-inducing practices such as frequent-flyer programs. Furthermore, it seems likely that firms can observe demand for their own product more easily than overall industry demand. Firms may thus use their own demand as a signal for total industry demand (Green and Porter, 1984) .
In the regressions, I measure demand with both industry-and firm-level enplanements, which is the number of passengers carried in a given month. The firm-level measure of demand is normalized enplanements, which is a firm's enplanements in a month divided by average enplanements for that firm over the period. Industry demand is measured by aggregate enplanements, which is the sum of enplanements for all carriers in the period.
Since a firm's intention in cutting price is to increase demand, enplanements is an endogenous variable. I thus estimate (1) using instrumental variables. When (1) is estimated as a linear probability model, this is straightforward using two-stage least squares. When (1) is estimated with a probit model, a more involved, two-step procedure must be used. Summarizing briefly results shown by Newey (1987) , one can consistently estimate the parameters of a probit model that has endogenous explanatory variables by first regressing the endogenous explanatory variables on a valid set of instruments and the exogenous explanatory variables, and then including the residuals from this regression as variables in the probit model. The probit is then estimated as usual. The parameters estimated for the residuals are nuisance parameters, and the remaining parameters are estimated consistently. As shown by Newey and McFadden (1994) , one must alter the usual formula for calculating estimates of standard errors to account for the fact that some of the variables in the second-step probit are derived from the first-step regression. In all probit results reported in this article, this correction has been made, following formulas given by Newey and McFadden (1994) .
The instruments used for enplanements are departures and a trio of regional macroeconomic variables. Departures (the number of planes that leave the ground) are correlated with enplanements (the number of passengers who board planes) but are unlikely to vary with price-war behavior for several reasons. First, airlines set their schedules far in advance of the actual flight; most airlines begin selling tickets six months before a flight. Furthermore, airport slot restrictions, timing constraints imposed by hub-and-spoke networks, and the necessity to physically coordinate with other airlines who use the same airports and flight routes mean that departures cannot be changed as quickly as fares. There are prevalent anecdotal accounts of airlines cancelling flights in response to market conditions, although the accusation is more commonly that they cancel empty flights than flights for which fares are low. In the data used in this article, the occurrence of a price war has virtually no predictive power in explaining the number of departures, which gives some empirical justification for the use of departures as an instrument.
A trio of macroeconomic measures based on unemployment, output, and income are also used as instruments. Demand for both major types of travel, business and leisure, varies with macroeconomic conditions. For example, a 1993 Gallup Survey reported that 49% of travel in the United States was for business, 35% to visit a friend or relative. Of the business travellers, the survey noted that respondents most often gave an increase in new business or better company financial condition as the reason for increased business travel. Those reporting less business travel tended to attribute it to decreasing business or deteriorating company financial conditions (Air Transport Association, 1993) . Since enplanements, the endogenous measure, varies across carriers as well as over time, the instruments ideally should reflect the different economic climates each of the carriers faces because of differences in their regional presences. I construct suitable instruments by weighting state-level measures of real per-capita personal income, real per-capita gross state product, and the rate of unemployment to reflect the regional makeup of each carrier's route network. The weights are based on passengers whose flights originate at the 26 largest airports in the country. About three-quarters of flights originate at one of these so-called large hub airports. The state weight for a given carrier is the share of its total large hub traffic in the sample period that originates from large hub airports in that state. Weights do not vary over time so as not to reintroduce endogeneity between price wars and the number of passengers. For example, the weighted unemployment measure for carrier i at time t would be
where j indicates the state, k indicates the airport, K j ⊂ K = {1, 2, . . . , 26} indicates the airport(s) in state j, U jt indicates the unemployment rate in state j at time t, P ik = t P ikt indicates the total number of i's passengers originating at airport k, and P i = k P ik is carrier i's total number of large hub passengers. The result is three variables-route-weighted personal income, output, and unemployment rate-reflecting the macroeconomic climate that each carrier faces.
14 It is particularly valuable to have both departures and the macroeconomic variables as instruments. Departures are correlated with enplanements not only because they determine capacity, but because airlines can adjust departures to reflect their forecasts of demand. The latter feature means that departures will be correlated with changes in demand that are predictable. In contrast, macroeconomic fluctuations are correlated with changes in demand that are unpredictable.
Financial measures. The question of how best to measure a firm's financial distress or risk of bankruptcy is an open issue in the accounting and finance literature. A method proposed by Altman (1968) relies on a combination of financial ratios, including measures of leverage, liquidity, and profitability. Since Altman, there have been a number of alternative proposals, including measures based on cash flow and on stock market returns or variability of returns. However, Mossman et al. (1998) find that Altman's method of financial ratios performs at least as well as more recent proposals. This article uses financial measures that reflect several different aspects of a firm's financial situation. The six measures include leverage ratios, interest coverage, liquidity measures, and operating profitability. Accounting definitions of the financial measures are given in Table 1 . The long-term debt ratio measures the share of a firm's financing that comes from long-term debt arrangements. The leverage ratio measures the share of financing that comes from all debt sources. Interest coverage measures the number of times that earnings would cover interest payments. The current ratio measures the ratio of current assets (assets that are expected to be converted into cash within a year) to current liabilities (liabilities due within the year). The quick ratio measures the ratio of extremely liquid, cash-like assets to current liabilities. The operating ratio measures the ratio of operating profits to expenses.
While the first three measures reflect the underlying solvency of the firm, the last three measure the more immediate liquidity of the firm. In an overview of empirical analyses of financial distress, Foster (1986) identifies leverage ratios and payment coverage ratios as consistently being among the significant predictors of financial distress and bankruptcy. He noted that liquidity and activity-related ratios are generally of limited power in distinguishing distressed or bankrupt firms. Therefore, though both the solvency and liquidity aspects of the firm are pertinent in the concept of financial distress, previous empirical work indicates that leverage and interest coverage may be the most likely to be empirically significant.
The regressions incorporate financial measures both linearly and as dummy variables indicating where in the distribution the measure falls. To benchmark where those threshold values fall, Table 2 reports the distribution of the ratios within the sample. In addition, the regressions instrument for financial measures with lagged financial measures. The need to instrument arises because a firm's involvement in a price war will affect the firm's cash flows in that period, and therefore it may affect current financial measures.
Another indicator of financial condition is bankruptcy. In the airline industry, bankrupt carriers have been blamed as a destabilizing influence. 15 Although bankruptcy is clearly associated with financial distress, declaring bankruptcy actually has the effect of reducing the pressure on a firm to meet its financial obligations. The results of an empirical study by Borenstein and Rose (1995) examining the effect of bankruptcy on the overall level of airline prices reflect this ambiguity. They find that on average, a carrier's prices dip just before it declares bankruptcy, then recover some after the firm has declared bankruptcy; competitors' prices appear to change very little or rise slightly over the same period. 16 The regressions in this article include a dummy for whether the firm is in bankruptcy during the month.
Controls.
As controls I use dummies for each of the eight years, for each of four seasons (quarters), and for being one of the three largest or three smallest firms in the industry. The latter variables are included in an effort to control for possible over-or underreporting of price-war leadership by the Wall Street Journal. They will also pick up any difference in price-war behavior as a result of asymmetries in firm size. The largest firms during the sample period are American Airlines ® , Delta Air Lines, and United Air Lines; the smallest are America West Airlines ® , Pan Am, and Western Airlines.
A firm that is considering cutting its price may take into account the likelihood that other firms will follow its initiative. As explored in greater detail in the next section, how likely a firm is to respond to an initiator's price cuts depends on the share of the respondent's routes it shares with the initiator. In the extreme, a firm that was a monopolist on all its routes would have little 15 "Desperate for cash, the bankrupt airlines have often started fare wars. A study this spring by Aviation Forecasting and Economics, an airline consulting group, concluded that 'in addition to their own losses, the bankrupt carriers have directly cost the rest of the U.S. scheduled airline industry at least $3 billion over the last three years.' " (New York Times Magazine, September 5, 1993, p. 37.) 16 Another reason for fares on bankrupt carriers to be low is to persuade consumers to buy tickets on an airline that may cease to exist. reason to expect a response to its price changes. To capture the risk of response a firm faces, I calculate a competition measure based on the sum of the shares of other carrier's traffic on routes served by each firm. Specifically, the "potential followers" measure for carrier i in period t is
where P jrt is the number of j's passengers on route r in period t, P jt = r P jrt is j's total traffic in period t, and I (i, r, t) is an indicator that carrier i serves route r in period t. Since the currentperiod number of passengers may be correlated with price-war behavior, which is the dependent variable, a one-period lag of this measure is the variable actually included in the estimations that follow.
Results and discussion
As described in Section 2, previous empirical literature on price wars has been concerned primarily with the effect of demand on price wars. For the purpose of comparison with earlier results, this section begins by estimating a specification reminiscent of earlier work. The result obtained by estimating a model that does not separate decisions to lead and follow in a price war and does not include financial characteristics is that the level of demand plays a role in predicting price wars, as found in previous research.
As the section goes on to show, however, when the decision to initiate a price war is considered separately, and when financial characteristics are included, demand no longer plays a significant role. Instead, financial condition, especially as measured by leverage and interest coverage, has a significant effect on price-war behavior.
Section 5 concludes with a brief examination of the decision to follow in a price war, finding that an important consideration in this case is the extent to which the routes of the following firm overlap with those of the leader.
Comparison to previous price war results. In keeping with previous analyses of price wars, this subsection examines the timing of price wars relative to demand fluctuations. It differs from the rest of the results reported in the article in two ways: financial measures are not included as explanatory variables, and the dependent variable does not distinguish between whether the firm is a price-war leader or follower, but only indicates whether it is a participant.
Equation (4) is estimated by the two-step probit model described in Section 4. The instruments for the endogenous demand measures are departures and route-weighted macroeconomic measures, also described in Section 4. Table 3 reports the first stage, instrument regression. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 4 . Each cell in the table contains three entries. The estimated probit coefficient is reported in the middle entry and its standard error in the bottom entry, in parentheses. The top entry, in italics, is the marginal probability effect implied by the estimated coefficient. For continuous variables, this should be interpreted as the rate of change in the probability of the firm participating in a price war in response to an incremental change in the Notes: Dependent variable is one for firm-months in which the firm participates in a price war, zero otherwise. Two-step probit estimation, instruments are firm-level and industry-level departures as appropriate, and three weighted macroeconomic measures. Year dummies included in all specifications, 1,023 observations. First entry is marginal probability, second entry is probit coefficient, third entry is standard error of probit coefficient adjusted for two-step procedure and for within-firm correlation.
variable. For dummy variables, this is the increase in probability if the variable were to change from zero to one, all else equal. The results in Table 4 give mixed evidence about the role of demand in price wars. The negative coefficient on industry-level enplanements indicates that a price war is more likely to occur during a month in which overall industry demand is low. This result is consistent with the Staiger and Wolak (1992) and Scherer (1980) models of price wars, which rely on capacity constraints and fixed costs, important features of the airline industry. The positive coefficient on firm-level enplanements suggests the opposite conclusion. In unreported regressions, the demand coefficients are also statistically significant when each is used alone. The seasonal effects provide some additional evidence that fluctuations in demand may have an effect on price-war behavior. Price wars appear to be less common in the second quarter than in the third and fourth quarters, and most common in the first quarter. In general, estimation of (4) shows evidence that in the absence of financial measures, demand fluctuations play some role in explaining price wars.
Decision to lead a price war. This subsection presents the results of estimating (1) in order to address the question of whether a firm's financial condition affects its decision to lead a price war. The results presented are for two measures of the ability of the firm to meet its long-term obligations, namely the leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio. Table 5 shows the results of estimating (1) using the two-step probit model. As in Table 4 , each cell in the table contains the estimated probit coefficient and its standard error and, in italics, the marginal probability effect Notes: Dependent variable is one for firm-months in which the firm starts a price war, zero otherwise. Two-step probit estimation, instruments are firm-level and industry-level departures, three weighted macroeconomic measures, and lagged financial measures. Year dummies included in all specifications, 1,023 observations. First entry is marginal probability, second entry is probit coefficient, third entry is standard error of probit coefficient adjusted for two-step procedure and for within-firm correlation.
implied by the estimated coefficient; the marginal probability in this case is the change in the probability that a firm will lead a price war. As the first two columns of Table 5 show, firms are more likely to lead price wars when they have high leverage ratios. The estimates in the second column indicate that a firm in the top 20% of the distribution of leverage is more likely by 5.4 percentage points to start a price war. Since the unconditional sample probability of leading a price war is 4.3%, this is a large effect. In addition, the first column of the table indicates that there is a significant linear relationship. The estimated marginal probability of .067 indicates that if, for example, a firm with equal amounts of debt and equity were to increase its debt by 10%, its probability of leading a price war would increase by .67 percentage points.
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The second two columns of Table 5 report the results for the decision to lead a price war as a function of interest coverage. Since a firm is better off with higher interest coverage, the coefficient on the interest coverage variable (in the third column of the table) should be negative, and the coefficient on the indicator that the firm is in the bottom of the distribution of interest coverage (in the fourth column) should be positive. The coefficient estimate in the third column is indeed significant and negative, indicating that firms are less likely to start price wars the more able they are to make their interest payments. The estimated effect, however, is very small. The effect is larger when using dummy variables. Namely, when a firm is in the bottom 40% of the distribution, it is more likely by 8.4 percentage points to initiate a price war.
The bankruptcy coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the specifications in Table 5 .
One potential concern is that since the data used to estimate (1) are from a monthly panel, the error terms might be correlated over time within a carrier. The standard errors reported in Table 5 are corrected to allow for such correlation. Another approach would be to use random effects. While this is not straightforward to implement in the instrumental variable probit, it is not difficult in a linear probability model. Doing so gives numerically similar results to those reported, although some of the financial variable coefficients become significant only at the 10% level or are statistically insignificant.
Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the findings of theoretical models that imply that highly leveraged firms are more likely to take on risk or to engage in activities that less-leveraged firms would not undertake.
The results in Table 5 indicate that firms in the worst 20% or 40% of the distribution, not just in the extreme tail, display an increased likelihood of starting price wars. Although 40% generally would be a large fraction of an industry to classify as distressed, as an industry airlines were in unusually poor financial condition compared to other industries during the 1985-1992 period. This can be seen by comparing the financial ratios for the airline industry to those of other industries. 18 For example, the median leverage ratio, which was .75 in airlines, was .59 in transportation, .57 in services, and .55 in manufacturing, while the median interest coverage, which was 2.94 in airlines, was 3.81 in transportation, 5.19 in services, and 6.51 in manufacturing. Thus it is reasonable to expect that a higher-than-normal fraction of airlines would be operating in a distressed condition.
Estimation results of the effect of measures of liquidity and profitability on price-war behavior are not reported. The standard errors of the financial coefficients are too large to draw reliable conclusions. Additionally, these measures are the most likely to be endogenous with price-war behavior. The estimated results for the nonfinancial variables are similar to those reported in Table 5 .
The stronger performance of the solvency measures compared to the liquidity and profitability measures is consistent with the finding in the bankruptcy prediction literature, discussed in Section 4, that leverage and fixed-payment coverage are generally more indicative of distress than liquidity. It may also indicate that airlines that face liquidity crises, but not underlying insolvency, have access to lines of credit or other resources that enable them to meet immediate obligations, and need not resort to price wars. Whichever is the case, it does appear that financial condition plays a role in initiating price wars, and that distressed carriers are more likely to initiate price wars.
In addition to the results for the financial measures, the estimates contain several other results. First, there is some evidence in Table 5 that the smallest carriers are less likely to initiate price wars. This estimate may indicate that the activities of small carriers are underreported, as suggested in Section 3. It seems likely, however, that this bias would affect the reporting of small carriers among a long list of followers more heavily than it would affect the identification of a small carrier if it were the initiator of a price war. Alternatively, it may be that since a small carrier will generally overlap relatively few of another airline's routes, price cuts by small carriers are less likely to prompt a response. This explanation is borne out in the next subsection, which shows that firms are less likely to respond to carriers whose routes overlap with few of their own, although it is not borne out directly by the potential-followers coefficient. The potential-followers variable is an admittedly ad hoc measurement, which may explain its statistical insignificance.
More strikingly, in these results the decision to start a price war is not strongly related to the level of demand. The coefficient estimates on the industry-and firm-level demand measures are generally positive in Table 5 , but the standard errors are in every case too large to reject statistical difference from zero. Additionally, none of the seasonal effects are statistically significant. While the financial measures may not be independent of demand, the precision with which the financial coefficients are estimated suggests that the insignificance of the demand measures is not due merely to multicollinearity. This is particularly noteworthy because of the importance that the level of demand plays in both the theoretical and previous empirical literature on price wars. There are several possible explanations for the difference between this and previous empirical work. One explanation is that this article differs from previous price-war literature in considering that firms may have asymmetric incentives to initiate price wars; in particular, some firms are financially constrained while others are not. It would be nearly impossible for an investigation of price wars that looked at the occurrence of price wars, without distinguishing price-war leaders from followers and without using firms' individual circumstances as explanatory variables, to find such an effect, while a demand effect would have been discoverable.
A second possibility is that demand is simply incorrectly specified or inadequately measured in the regressions presented here. One alternative demand specification is that of Morrison and Winston (1996) , who use macroeconomic measures directly instead of enplanements to predict airline price wars. Employing a similar strategy here by using the weighted macroeconomic measures (or anticipated and unanticipated fluctuations in those measures) in these regressions directly instead of as instruments produces results that are very similar to those reported in Table  5 . Specifically, the point estimates and statistical significance of the financial measures are similar, and the macroeconomic demand measures are insignificant. Another possible empirical model of demand is that of Borenstein and Shepard (1996) , who study the dynamics of gasoline pricing, although not explicitly price wars. They use both a current and an expected demand measure based on volume sales of gasoline. They predict expected volume on the basis of current volume and dummy variables that exploit regional differences in the seasonality of gasoline demand. Such a strategy is less successful in my data, because airlines do not face sufficiently large differences in the seasonality of demand. As a result, expected demand and current demand measures are colinear. A final possibility is to measure demand in terms of capacity utilization, or "load factor" in industry parlance. This would specifically test the Staiger and Wolak (1992) model of price wars. If load factor is used in place of or in addition to the demand measures reported here, the results are substantially the same.
Distinguishing financial from economic distress. One question raised by the results reported so far is whether the estimated impact of the finanical measures on price-war behavior is indeed the result of financial distress or whether economic distress causes both poor finanical condition and price-war behavior. The conceptual distinction is the following. A firm could be financially solvent but face slack demand, aggressive entry, or be poorly managed and thus be unprofitable (economically distressed). On the other hand, a firm could be profitable on an operating basis but be highly leveraged and therefore financially distressed. While the conceptual distinction is simple, making the empirical distinction between the two is more difficult because a period of economic distress can lead a firm into financial distress. A related issue is raised by Gertner's (1993) model in which firm asymmetries, for example in the attractiveness of route structure, increase some firms' incentives to start a price war. A poor airline will not be able to fill its seats when prices are high, but it can when prices are low. Because it is difficult to measure airline quality, this is difficult to test directly. To the extent that this effect operates through economic distress or operating losses, the Andrade and Kaplan (1998)-style test described in the next paragraph also tests this hypothesis. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) attempt to distinguish between financial and economic distress in a study of the success of highly leveraged transactions by examining only those firms with positive operating profits (i.e., economically nondistressed firms). I can perform a similar experiment by using only observations for quarters in which a firm has positive operating profits.
19 Table 6 reports the results of estimating some of the earlier regressions using data from the economically nondistressed subsample. Results are reported only for the leverage ratio. Interest coverage is highly correlated with operating profitability, leaving few observations with low interest coverage and operating profits. 20 While this is not a cleanly exogenous partition of the data, it is still the case that if the financial distress measures merely proxy for economic distress, then the coefficients on the financial measures should be smaller in magnitude in the economically nondistressed subsample than in the full sample.
Instead, the results show the opposite; namely, financially distressed firms are more likely, even in periods of operating profitability, to initiate price wars. Although the estimated marginal probability effects of 12.5 and 13.7 percentage points are larger than those estimated on the full sample, the two specifications are not directly comparable. The reason is that probit coefficients are identified only up to the standard deviation of the error term; if the underlying variance of the subsample in Table 6 is different from that of the full sample in Table 5 , then the coefficients and marginal probability effects are implicitly renormalized. A more appropriate comparison is to see whether the magnitude of the financial measure coefficients relative to the other coefficients in the specification changes between the full sample and subsample. On this basis, the relative magnitude of the financial measure coefficients is still larger in Table 6 than in Table 5 , although the difference is more pronounced for the first column of Table 6 than the second.
Decision to follow in a price war. Although financial considerations and the decisions to lead a price war are the primary concern of this article, for completeness I include a brief analysis of price-war followers' decisions. After one firm has cut its prices, other firms have to decide how to respond. This decision is likely to depend on how the potential respondent is affected by the price cut, which in turn depends on the number of routes the potential respondent shares with the price cutter. Even if a particular carrier would not have chosen to cut prices on its own initiative, it may do so when undercut by a competitor. The primary hypothesis in this subsection is that the likelihood that a firm will respond to a competitor's price cut depends on the extent to which the competitor serves the same routes as the initiating firm. Note that major carriers do not always join all price wars. In fact, in some cases carriers are reported as explicitly announcing a decision not to join a price war.
I model the probability that a firm will join an existing price war as a function of demand, controls, and also the extent to which the firm's routes overlap with the routes of the price-war leader. Although the financial condition motivation described in Section 2 applies primarily to the decision to initiate a price war, I include some of the financial variables in the follow specification Notes: Sample includes observations only in quarters in which firm had positive operating profits. Dependent variable is one for firm-months in which the firm starts a price war, zero otherwise. Two-step probit estimation, instruments are firm-leveland industry-level departures, three weighted macroeconomic measures, and lagged financial measures. Year dummies included in all specifications, 529 observations. First entry is marginal probability, second entry is probit coefficient, third entry is standard error of probit coefficient adjusted for two-step procedure and for within-firm correlation.
as well.
The demand measures and controls are the same as those used in the estimation of (1). Equation (5) is estimated using the two-step probit, instrumenting for enplanements with departures and macroeconomic variables and for the financial measures with lagged financial measures. Since the decision to follow can be made only if there is an existing price war, (5) is estimated using firm-month observations for months in which there is a price war, but in which the firm in question is not the leader. Route overlap with the price-war leader(s) is measured for each carrier in each month as the share of that carrier's traffic that is on routes also served by the price-war leader. The overlap measure for carrier i in period t is where r indicates the route, I (r, t) equals one if route r is served by a price-war leader in the sample period, P ir = t P irt indicates the number of i's passengers on route r in the same period, and P i = r P ir is carrier i's total passengers in the sample period. 21 The information on route traffic is calculated from the U.S. Department of Transportation's Origin and Destination Survey. The route-overlap variable used here is more aggregate than the ideal measure, which would be the amount of overlap a carrier has with a leader on routes that are affected by the price war. Since the information on price wars indicates whether a carrier is involved in a price war but not which routes are affected, it is not possible to construct a less aggregate measure. Also, traffic information is available quarterly, so the route-overlap measure is based on the price-war leader of a given month, but using quarterly share information. Information on the distribution of route overlap with the leader is given in Table 7 .
The results for the decision to follow in a price war are given in Table 8 . These results confirm the intuition that a carrier is significantly more likely to respond to a price war if it shares much of its route network with the leader(s). The estimate in the first column indicates that an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of a carrier's traffic on routes served by a price-war leader increases the probability that that carrier will join the price war by 7.05 percentage points. The sample probability that a carrier will follow in a price war (conditioning on there being a price war and the carrier not being a leader) is 47.0%. In the specification that includes interest coverage, the estimated coefficient is slightly smaller.
In none of the follow-decision specifications, including others not reported here, are the financial measures statistically significant; in the unreported specifications, the route-overlap coefficient is similar to that reported in Table 8 . There is some evidence that carriers take into account the state of demand when deciding whether to follow in a price war. In the two specifications reported in Table 8 , firm-level enplanements has a marginal probability estimate of approximately .3, which is significant at the 5% level. This would indicate, for example, that a firm experiencing demand that is 50% higher than usual would be more likely by 15 percentage points to follow in a price war.
A final result is that large carriers are significantly more likely and smaller carriers less likely to join price wars; this result holds even though the regression is controlling for the level of route overlap. This may indicate that the overall size of a carrier's network, not just the portion shared with the leader, has an effect on the probability of joining a price war; it may also be evidence of a reporting bias toward larger carriers and away from smaller carriers.
The results of this subsection must be interpreted with care. It may be that a particular carrier's decision to follow in a price war is dependent on whether other carriers decide to do so. If this is Notes: Sample includes observations only in months in which a price war occurred, and for which the firm in question was not the leader. Dependent variable is one for firm-months in which the firm follows in a price war, zero otherwise. Two-step probit estimation, instruments are firm-level and industry-level departures, three weighted macroeconomic measures, and lagged financial measures. Year dummies included in all specifications, 281 observations. First entry is marginal probability, second entry is probit coefficient, third entry is standard error of probit coefficient adjusted for two-step procedure and for correlation across firms within month.
the case, then the set of firms that will enter the price war is not uniquely identified in equilibrium, although the total number of entering firms may be. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) describe this problem in the context of simultaneous-market-entry games. As a result, the probit estimations of this subsection must be interpreted as descriptive, rather than as directly representative of an equilibrium outcome. One way to handle this would be to base an estimation on the total number of firms that participate in a price war, rather than on the identities of the followers (Berry, 1992) . Employing such a strategy in this particular case is hampered by the fact that there are only 31 price wars. In unreported regressions, the number of followers in a price war was found to be positively related to both the level of demand, at the 10% confidence level, and to the amount of overlap among all potential followers or among one or several of the most overlapped potential followers, but not at conventional levels of significance.
Conclusion
This article has examined how an airline's financial situation affects its conduct in price wars. The primary hypothesis is that an airline that has difficulty meeting financial obligations and is in danger of bankruptcy stands to gain the most from an increase in demand engendered by a significant price drop. Such an airline should thus be most likely to initiate a price war. The article empirically tests this hypothesis using data on the participation in price wars of 14 major U.S. carriers, and information on their financial conditions. Information on price-war participation comes from reports in the Wall Street Journal. This procedure identifies the timing of price wars more accurately than methods used in previous studies and makes it possible to distinguish pricewar leaders from followers.
The empirical results indicate that firms whose financial measures are in the lowest third of the distribution are more likely by about 5 to 8 percentage points to start price wars. This is a large effect compared to the unconditional sample probability of starting a price war of 4.3%. The results are significant for measures of leverage and interest coverage, which are among the financial variables that the finance and accounting literature has found to be most predictive of bankruptcy.
In contrast to the results of previous empirical studies of price wars, fluctuations in demand do not play a significant role. Specifications using demand measured at the level of the firm, industry, and aggregate economy, as well as a measure of demand relative to capacity, all fail to find a significant effect. The estimated effect of the financial measures, however, is robust to the specification of demand.
The article makes three primary contributions. First, it suggests that price wars are motivated not only by market conditions that are external to the firm, but by internal characteristics of the firms operating in the market. Specifically, it has suggested that since firms in worse financial condition discount future returns more heavily relative to current returns, such firms will find price wars more attractive. Second, the article has suggested that the decisions to start a price war and to join an existing price war have different motivations. For the question posed in this article, namely the effect of financial conditions, it was necessary to examine the two decisions separately. However, given the results here, there may be gains to separating the analysis in other contexts as well. Finally, the article has provided additional evidence on the link between a firm's financial characteristics and its conduct in product markets.
